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CONTINUITY OR DISRUPTION?
CHANGING ELITES AND THE EMERGENCE OF CRONYISM 
AFTER THE GREAT RECESSION – THE CASE OF HUNGARY 
JÓZSEF PÉTER MARTIN1 
ABSTRACT After a short theoretical overview about the interplay between 
institutions and elites, the paper analyses the economic performance operationalized 
by the GDP and the quality of governance in Hungary in comparative perspective, 
considering two milestones, namely, the impact of the Great Recession, and the 
change of government in 2010. The role of elites and elite moves are revealed in 
these developments. In Hungary, the local crisis started before the Great Recession 
as the slide of the quality of governance and mismanagement of the economic policy 
can be observed since the accession to the EU. The paper elaborates the disruptive 
nature of the system built after 2010 with a special focus to the schemes of corruption 
and cronyism. Finally, the paper confronts the political elite’s endeavors with some 
perceptions of the population. 
KEYWORDS: institutionalism, elites, corruption, cronyism, economic 
development, quality of governance
INTRODUCTION
Democratic backsliding and the rise of populism throughout Central and 
Eastern Europe have been subject to vast academic and policy research in the 
past years (e.g. Kornai 2015, Pappas 2014, Freedom House 2014, Transparency 
International Hungary 2017). The surge of populism and the impact of the global 
crisis have put at stake the democratic polity and institutions established in 
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the 1990s. In several countries democracy seems to be emptying out and has 
become just procedural, focusing only on elections and the rule of the majority. 
The substance of democratic norms (i.e., the functioning of democratic checks 
and balances, the protection of minority rights, and the active participation of 
citizens) is losing ground. Some CEE societies seem to be regressing, to use 
Douglass North’s terms, from the previously established ‘free access order’ 
towards ‘closed access order’ (North et al. 2009). 
The ‘capture’ of the state by influential groups – i.e. the systematic downplaying 
of furtherance of commonweal in favor of making particularistic gains (Hellman 
et al 2000, Transparency International Hungary 2011) – has become rather the rule 
than the exception across Central and Eastern Europe (Innes 2014). Democratic 
institutions initially designed to control the government’s endeavors, as well as 
ensure a level playing field for societal and economic actors have in many cases 
become the instruments of oligarchs and the ruling political elite. Informality and 
action is tending to overrule established formal institutions. 
Having been a member of the European Union (EU) since 2004, Hungary has 
a nominally democratic system with institutions that were initially established 
to respect the separation of powers. Between 1989 and 2010 consensus among 
political parties and in public discourse existed that, according to the eighteenth 
century Montesquieu’ doctrine, legislative, executive and judicial powers need 
to be separated, and the government should be controlled by independent 
institutions. 
However, Viktor Orbán, a charismatic leader of the political party Fidesz, 
who had already governed the country between 1998 and 2002, made it 
clear in opposition between 2002 and 2010 that once he got back into power 
he wanted more than a “simple” change of government. The popularity of 
Fidesz in opposition started to soar from the middle of the first decade after 
the millennium. This can be explained partly by the political crisis that was 
triggered by the leaked speech of the then prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány 
in 2006, after which the government’s popularity started freefalling2. In a 
speech most probably intended to be kept secret, Gyurcsány admitted to his 
party members that betweeen 2004 and 2006 they had lied and done nothing 
to win the 2006 election3. After the landslide victory in 2010 Fidesz gained a 
supermajority in parliament, and Viktor Orbán declared the foundation of a new 
“regime”, the so-called “System of National Cooperation” in which the state 
would play a crucial role. 
2  Ferenc Gyurcsány was prime minister of Hungary (for the Hungarian Socialist Party) from 2004-
2009 in a coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ, a liberal party). 
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C5%90sz%C3%B6d_speech 
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Fidesz is a right-wing party that also belongs to the EU-wide European 
People’s Party. It has used nationalist rhetoric, sometimes with an adamant anti-
EU tone, although it has not questioned Hungary’s EU membership so far.
Fidesz was able not only in 2010 but also after the next election in 2014 to form 
a government with the support of more than two-thirds of MPs who decided to 
re-engineer the entire public arena. For Prime Minister Orbán, the desire for 
elite change overwrote respect for control mechanisms. The system he has built 
might be called a simulated democracy (Lengyel 2014, 2017) or an autocratic 
hybrid regime (Kornai 2015); i.e., a polity existing somewhere between liberal 
democracy and dictatorship.       
The concepts of liberal democracy, state capture, checks and balances, as well 
as democratic backsliding are normative categories and thus may be used as 
indicators of the deviation of political systems from the Weberian ideal type 
of liberal democracy that involves the impartiality of governance and a non-
monopolistic market economy. The “extent” of this deviation can be estimated 
by proxy indicators in empirical analyses. 
In this paper, after a short theoretical overview about the interplay between 
institutions and elites, we focus on economic performance and the quality 
of governance in Hungary with special regard to corruption over the last 
decade. We describe the role of elites and elite moves in these developments. 
The main question we address is whether continuity and/or disruption has 
prevailed in the last decade considering two milestones: namely, the impact 
of the Great Recession that started in 2008, and the change of government 
in Hungary in 2010.  
VIRTUOUS AND VICIOUS ‘CIRCLES’ OF 
INSTITUTIONS AND ELITES  
In the most recent three decades, the ‘new institutional economics’ (North 
1990) that was previously influenced by economic sociology made remarkable 
steps in explaining durable economic development. From the initial conclusion 
that “institutions matter”, nowadays economists and the economic policy 
literature echo the mainstream verdict that, besides traditional, neo-classical 
factors based on capital and labor accumulation, institutions play a significant, 
perhaps even decisive role in economic development (North 1990, Rodrik et al 
2002, Acemoglu et al 2004, Acemoglu-Robinson 2013, World Bank 2002, WEF 
2001-2017). 
According to a growth model of new institutional economics provided by 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) economic institutions define whether a country is 
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capable of developing in the long run. Economic institutions depend on the 
nature of political institutions. By political institutions or polity, in the first 
instance we mean whether the implied country is a democracy, a dictatorship, or 
somewhere in between; a hybrid regime. In this model the political institutions 
define the de jure distribution of political power which eventually influences 
the ruling elite’s decisions about economic institutions. For Acemoglu et al., 
political power and the distribution of political resources slowly change the 
independent variables which ultimately determine economic performance. 
Political institutions do not alter too often: only in the cases when the ruling 
elite is forced to change. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013), in their renowned book Why Nations Fail, 
make a distinction between virtuous and vicious ‘circles’. The first are initiated by 
inclusive and the latter by extractive institutions. Inclusive political institutions 
place constraints on the elite’s endeavors by fostering pluralism and rule of law 
which promote a level playing field and fair competition. These factors then 
enhance investment and increase economic performance. This eventually leads 
to more resources for distribution, thus more equal opportunities. The vicious 
circle is the opposite of the virtuous one, with a series of negative feedback 
loops (see Figure 1).
While the new institutionalism provides a notable explanation for 
sustainable economic development, it does not provide a coherent view 
of the role of elites, actors and personalities. Institutionalism is prone to 
attribute an occasional role to actors; consequently, in this paradigm the 
elites may be considered the passive executors of the institutional will. But 
this claim is controversial in new institutionalism: for example, North states 
that informal institutions such as norms and culture have effects through the 
perceptions (mental beliefs) of actors. And, according to Acemoglu et al., the 
role of the elite is primarily important during critical historical turns that 
induce institutional change. However, in the concept of new institutionalism 
the elites remain more like an abstract category, with a murky relationship 
between them and institutions. 
The new elite paradigm (Higley-Pakulski 2000) partly opposes 
institutionalism by claiming that actors can overwrite rules and become game-
changers. In the new elite paradigm, the most important question is how the 
elites relate to each other horizontally (Ilonszki-Lengyel 2014). In this concept, 
the trust (distrust) of the elites and cooperation with each other is logically and 
factually prior to institutional arrangements. Moreover, interaction among 
elites is considered the main method of differentiation among regimes and 
polities, and social changes generally originate from the elite moves that result 
in new configurations. 
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Figure 1. An interpretation of the interplay between institutions and economic performance
While institutionalism can be interpreted to mean that the elites are the 
passive bailiffs of institutional will, in the new elite paradigm institutions should 
be considered the passive subjects of the endeavors of the elite. For elite theory, 
only the disposition of the masses (i.e., public opinion) can constrain the elites. 
The new elite paradigm can thus be interpreted as getting rid of the “utopias” 
that some of institutionalist approaches present (Higley-Pakulski 2000). 
A further elaboration of the new elite paradigm suggests that instead of 
speaking about causality between institutions and elites, covariance prevails. 
According to a typology of political regimes (Lengyel 2014, Ilonszki-Lengyel, 
2014), the characteristics of political institutions are interlinked with elite 
configurations. This is related to the role of actors and personalities. On one end 
of this scale of regimes is consolidated democracy, which implies a consensus 
when the elites accept each other as legitimate partners, and when, in line 
with liberal democracy, not only the rule of the majority but also the rights of 
minorities prevail. This kind of democracy implies the existence of responsive 
and responsible leaders. At the other end of the scale we have “elected autocracy”, 
in which institutions serve as the instruments of central government. In these 
regimes the elites are ideologically homogenous and leaders are pseudo-
transformative; i.e., their words and actions are not harmonized. Between the 
two extremes, we find simulated democracies (hybrid regimes) in which civil 
rights are not respected, elite consensus is weak, and leaders’ promises are often 
not realistic. 
The configurations of elites, institutions and personalities, as described by the 
typology of the new elite paradigm, may influence the quality of governance 
(Lengyel 2017), and ultimately, economic performance. Accordingly, the 
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theoretical scheme is similar to the distinction of virtuous and vicious circles by 
Acemoglu et al. However, the game changers in the two concepts are different: 
they are the elites and personalities in the new elite paradigm, and the institutions 
in new institutionalism. 
THE SLIDE OF HUNGARY:  
WHERE IS THE STARTING POINT?     
Hungary underwent a drastic but relatively successful economic transformation 
in the early 1990s and became a member of the EU in 2004 as the completion of 
political desires (Balázs 2014), and with high hopes of economic convergence 
with the West. Then – in the first decade after accession – Hungary’s economic 
performance became the poorest among all the new CEE member states (Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Bulgaria). If we “fix” real GDP in 2005 at a nominal value of 100 – as a starting 
point – then we can observe that GDP grew faster in all the nine countries 
than in Hungary until 2015, independently of whether GDP/capita was initially 
higher (e.g. in Slovenia and Czech Republic) or lower (the other 7 countries). 
The differences are sometimes conspicuous: GDP in Poland rose by 50 %, and 
in Slovakia by 47 %. In Hungary, meanwhile, it only grew by 11 % (see Table 1.). 
Table 1. Cumulated GDP growth in CEE countries in 2016 (2005=100) 
 2005 2016
Hungary 100,0 110,6
Poland 100,0 150,2
Czech Republic 100,0 125,9
Slovakia 100,0 147,2
Slovenia 100,0 114,5
Romania 100,0 136,5
Estonia 100,0 119,8
Latvia 100,0 118,7
Lithuania 100,0 130,1
Bulgaria 100,0 132,5
Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.
do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00114&plugin=1,
 
A number of academic publications have tried to decipher the reason why 
Hungary lagged behind regional competitors after the millennium (Pogátsa 
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2007, Oblath 2014, Bod 2014). The crisis and the arrears of the once “eminent 
pupil” of the region might be linked to  economic instability which may stem 
from policy failures and institutional factors. Economic policy serves as a means 
of establishing an institutional set-up suitable for durable development, although 
the distinction between the two is somewhat murky (Rodrik et al 2002). 
From 2001-2002 the incumbent Hungarian governments pursued an economic 
policy unique to Central Europe which ultimately led to turbulence even before 
the global financial crisis (Martin 2013). The Hungarian government was the 
only one in the region which had to introduce severe austerity measures as many 
as three times – in 1995, 2006 and in 2009 – during the 20 years between the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the Great Recession. This is one of the reasons why 
Hungary is an outlier in the Visegrad group of Central European countries – 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – concerning economic 
development in the first decade of the new millennium (Martin 2014). 
Hungary pursued an extremely loose fiscal policy and plunged into “fiscal 
alcoholism” (Kopits 2006) between 2001 and 2006 when public spending 
soared and the budget deficit was constantly higher than the EU ceiling of 3 
%. In the two election years (2002 and 2006) the deficit rose to 9 %, by far the 
highest rate among the OECD countries at a time when world markets were 
still liquid. Because of Hungary’s dangerously growing budget deficit, the EU 
started an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) against the country immediately 
after accession which lasted nine years – until 2013.  
However, the period of excessive deficit could also be considered a time of 
relative prosperity and convergence towards the EU. In this period the growth 
and increase in household income was fostered by state expenses which 
ultimately were covered from foreign debt. Debt rose from 52 % in 2001 to 65 
% in 2006 compared to GDP. An empirical study (Oblath 2014) points out that 
Hungary was the only country between 2000 and 2013 among the new member 
states where economic growth and the budget deficit were positively correlated. 
In other words, growth in Hungary was induced by growing state expenditure, 
and thus a pro-cyclical economic policy until 2006. The danger of adopting this 
policy in “good times” is that no resources might be left for “bad times” – as 
Hungary was due to discover. In the other Visegrad countries, growth was fed 
by a disciplined fiscal policy (involving competition and investment) rather than 
public spending. 
In Hungary, as the budget deficit between 2004 and 2006 was unsustainable 
under the pressure of the market and the EU, the government was obliged to 
introduce strict austerity measures in 2006. Consequently, the budget deficit 
decreased from 9.4 % in 2006 to 5.1 % in 2007. This drastic fall in public 
spending involved a drop in the growth rate. Hungary’s GDP tumbled to the 
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lowest level in the EU at only 1 % in 2007. Thus, the local crisis induced by the 
huge budget deficit preceded the Great Recession.   
The Visegrad countries entered in different positions into the turbulent times 
of the global financial and economic crisis. This erupted in 2007-2008 in the 
United States and then spread to Europe and to CEE via financial products, a 
confidence crisis (a lack of lending) and foreign trade (European Commission 
2009). It seriously affected the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, but 
impacts differed across countries as both the pre-crisis legacy as well as crisis 
management strategies were different (European Central Bank, 2010). The 
Baltic States plunged into a deep, double-digit recession in 2009, but rebounded 
very quickly. Poland, on the other hand, was the only country in the EU that was 
able to avoid recession in 2009. Also worth noting is that there were only three 
countries which did not grow in 2010-2011: Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and 
Hungary. However, the former two  had a considerably bigger GDP/capita than 
Hungary for a long time. Thus, it is not surprising that in Hungary perceptions 
about “the state of the domestic economy” were at a historic low point in 2009. 
A Eurobarometer survey showed that only 5 % of the Hungarian population 
thought that the state of the economy was “very good” or “good” – the smallest 
share in CEE at that time4. 
Because of soaring government expenditure and huge indebtedness Hungary 
became a target for speculation in 2008 when the global crisis hit the country. 
This jeopardized a fast after-crisis recovery, and explains why Hungary could 
not pursue an anti-cyclical fiscal policy (i.e., government expenditure did not 
invigorate the economy in the short run, unlike in other Visegrad countries). 
Hungary was the first country in the EU after the eruption of the crisis that had 
to turn to international organizations to ask for a bailout to prevent state default. 
A drastic austerity package had to be introduced to rebuild trust and prevent the 
collapse of the economy. The price the country had to pay was a recession of 6.6 
% in 2009, which was the biggest slump among the Visegrad countries. 
The Hungarian economy remained unstable after 2010 when Fidesz took 
power. Despite the new government’s rhetoric about reducing the budget deficit 
and putting an end to stop-go cycles, between 2010 and 2012 they continued: 
after an expansion of spending, austerity measures were introduced that pushed 
the country into recession. After 2012, the influx of EU funds was considerably 
and continuously increased, fostering economic growth. After continuous 
growth, in 2016 the share of EU funds reached almost 6 % of GDP5. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/27/groupKy/229 
5  http://www.portfolio.hu/unios_forrasok/gazdasagfejlesztes/ 
 meg_ket_evig_hasithat_magyarorszag_aztan_beleallhat_a_foldbe.251569.html  
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After 2011 the new government started to respect the 3 % budget deficit 
ceiling, thus the rise in indebtedness came to a halt. But the new government, 
supported by a supermajority of MPs, pursued an “unorthodox” economic 
policy that countered “liberal” and “mainstream” doctrines in its interpretation. 
For example, the government targeted some companies, mainly service 
sector, and also levied significant surtaxes in three sectors – banking, retail 
and telecommunication. They also eliminated the private pension scheme, 
nationalizing most pension savings. Moreover, tailor-made legislation and the 
so-called strategic partnership agreements between the government and select 
groups of companies made clear the government’s intention to divide the private 
sector into “good” and “bad” companies (Transparency International Hungary 
2014). The industrial sector was mostly labeled as “good”, and the service sector 
as “bad”– the government put the burden on the latter. 
Consequently, until 2010 the main factor driving economic instability was 
economic policy, but after 2010 instability derived from the unpredictable and 
tailor-made legislative and business environment. In both cases, the norms of 
good governance were breached, but from different angles. 
The deeper explanations of economic instability before and after the Great 
Recession in Hungary leads us to institutional factors and elite configurations 
(Martin 2016). Despite political divisions, in the 1990s the basic consensus 
about formal institutions (i.e., the rules of the game) prevailed. In the 2000s, 
however, this elite consensus started to erode. After losing the national election 
in 2002, Fidesz questioned the legitimacy of the new government (Ilonszki-
Lengyel 2010, 2014, Fric at al. 2014, Lengyel 2017). “The homeland can’t be in 
opposition”, declared PM Orbán in 2002. As the government and the opposition 
did not recognize each other as reliable partners, the consensus concerning the 
formal institutions as well as the informal ones, crumbled. Hungarian politics 
plunged into a vicious ‘circle’ catalyzed by distrust following the leaked speech 
of PM Gyurcsány in 2006.   
The disruption of elite consensus and the atmosphere of a “cold civil war” 
implied that the power game had to be played at any price, both in government and 
opposition. This is a logical explanation for why extensive fiscal policy until 2010 
and the “unorthodoxy” after 2010 were pursued, despite their economic irrationality. 
The manipulation and “purchasing” of voters using populist measures emerged 
as a legitimate means of keeping or obtaining power. For example, the excessive 
public spending between 2001 and 2011 was green-lighted by the Hungarian elites, 
unlike in Poland where the implicit elite consensus and a pragmatic economic policy 
created good conditions for economic growth (Győrffy, 2012). 
In Hungary, economic policy and the institutional system have become 
dependent on elite struggles since EU accession. Party politics has gradually 
264
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
JÓZSEF PÉTER MARTIN
violated economic rationality, thus the erosion of elite consensus has led to the 
erosion of governance. 
THE QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE AND CRONYISM 
Deteriorating governance 
By quality of governance we mean a set of formal and informal institutions 
which enables the creation of an environment appropriate for a functioning 
democracy and market economy (Rodrik 1999, Kaufman et al. 2010, Rothstein 
2011). A clearly delineated system of property rights, the rule of law, a clean 
government, apparatus suitable for curbing corruption, the capacity of 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and trust and 
social cooperation are usually listed among the factors of good governance. The 
quality of governance concerns the exercise of, not access to, power. Respect 
for the rule of law and the control of corruption may be the two most important 
factors of good governance. Rule of law first of all means the impartiality of law 
enforcement. By corruption, we refer to the abuse of entrusted power or public 
office for private gain (World Bank 1997, OECD 2012) – this extends beyond the 
notion of corruption in criminal cases.    
The operationalization of good governance is mainly possible using proxies. 
A widely used set of proxies in which the assessments of experts and businesses 
are applied is the World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank. 
The WGIs are: rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, 
accountability, quality of regulation and political stability. An empirical study 
by Bo Rothstein (2011) based on WGIs shows a 90 % correlation between rule 
of law, control of corruption and effectiveness of a government. 
For measuring the quality of government through proxies in Hungary using a 
comparative perspective we use the WGIs (see Table 2). Most of the indicators 
indicate that performance has deteriorated for more than a decade. Both in 
terms of rule of law and control of corruption, Hungary’s positions were the 
worst among the Visegrad countries in 2016. The contrast between the trends is 
eye-catching when we compare Poland and Hungary. Moreover, the stagnating 
Czech and Slovak proxies are also different from the declining Hungarian one. 
These proxies of governance for Hungary indicate no major rupture or even 
shift due to the global crisis, nor to the change of government in 2010, and the 
milestones do not affect the generally downward trend. The rule of law indicators 
indicate a worsening situation since 2007 (a decrease from 81 in 2007 to 67 in 
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2015), while the corruption proxy indicates deterioration since 2004 (from 76 in 
2004 to 61 in 2015). This continuous bad governance may be explained by the 
durable lack of economic stability elaborated on in the previous chapter. 
The trend of the WGI indicator for control of corruption for Hungary looks 
similar to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)6 
which detects public sector corruption according to an assessment of businesses 
and experts. In 2016, the CPI for Hungary dropped seven places in the rankings, 
landing at 57. The country achieved 48 points, three points below the previous 
year’s score. The perception of Hungary’s situation in terms of corruption has 
been deteriorating for years. The decline is even more striking in comparison 
with the EU and CEE countries. Hungary currently lags in 24-25th place out 
of the 28 member states of the EU, tied with Romania. With the exception of 
Greece, Italy, and the most corruption-infected Bulgaria, this proxy shows that 
every EU member state performs better than Hungary. According to this data, 
corruption in Hungary has been increasing since its EU accession. For a number 
of years Hungary’s scores were some of the best after Estonia and Slovenia, but 
now only Bulgaria is behind Hungary among the CEE countries.
Other surveys also underpin perceptions about Hungary’s slide in terms of 
transparency. Economic actors rate the Hungarian government’s measures 
against corruption as insufficient. According to the survey of the World Economic 
Forum (WEF, 2001-2017) which appraises competitiveness each year, Hungary’s 
competitiveness has been nosediving for more than a decade.  Hungary was the 
28th most competitive economy in the world in 2001, but it only ranked 69th on 
the competitiveness list last year. The perception of institutional efficiency and 
transparency is outstandingly bad: from 26th place in 2001, the country had 
slipped to 114th by 2016. Businessmen in Hungary named unpredictability and 
corruption as the main obstacles to running a successful business. The main 
trigger for the slide in competitiveness is the poor performance of institutions. 
Hungary’s competitiveness as well as institutional performance deviates not 
only from the EU but also from the CEE average7. Competitiveness as a kind of 
long-term growth potential may be operationalized using 12 pillars, one of which 
is institutional. The institutional factor as the bottom element of a pyramid may 
determine the others (Vakhal 2012) such as capital and labor accumulation, or 
education and innovation. 
6 https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016 
7  For these charts, see Slides 14-15.: https://transparency.hu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/CPI-2016-
prezentacio.pdf
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Table 2. Selected quality of governance proxies in the Visegrad countries*
HUNGARY
 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015
Rule of law 78 80 80 72 68 72 67
Corruption 76 73 68 65 65 61 61
Accountability 86 79 76 75 70 67 66
Quality of regulation 84 86 86 81 78 75 74
Government 
effectiveness 79 78 75 72 71 72 71
POLAND
 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015
Rule of law 63 61 66 68 72 77 76
Corruption 59 62 67 70 72 71 71
Accountability 81 72 75 80 81 82 80
Quality of regulation 76 72 75 80 79 81 80
Government 
effectiveness 71 67 68 71 72 75 75
CZECH REPUBLIC
 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015
Rule of law 72 73 77 80 82 85 83
Corruption 69 66 65 65 64 65 67
Accountability 79 76 78 77 77 78 78
Quality of regulation 80 84 85 86 81 81 81
Government 
effectiveness 79 82 81 78 77 80 82
SLOVAKIA
 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015
Rule of law 65 65 68 65 64 69 70
Corruption 69 69 66 64 61 60 62
Accountability 80 76 74 74 77 76 75
Quality of regulation 83 85 83 81 81 79 75
Government 
effectiveness 80 79 78 76 74 75 75
* On a scale between 1 and 100, where 1 is the poorest and 100 the best performance 
Source: World Bank WGI; http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports  
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Corruption as an institutional factor and one of the main obstacles to good 
governance affects economic performance. A piece of research by OECD (2012) 
shows significant correlation between the WGI’s control of corruption indicator 
and GDP per capita. For the EU, the correlation is even more striking (see 
Chart 1). The causal relationship, however, between the governance indicators, 
including corruption and economic performance, is vague (Rothstein 2011). 
Still, empirical research finds no evidence of a positive correlation between 
sustainable growth and a high level of corruption in Western countries. The 
inclusiveness of the institutions do matter for long-term competitiveness. 
However, Asia seems to be an outlier in terms of the worldwide trend; i.e. in a 
number of Asian countries a high level of corruption and economic prosperity 
appear to go hand in hand (OECD 2012). 
The business climate may serve as a channel through which corruption and 
breaches of rule of law affect economic performance. A hard indicator of the 
business climate is the investment rate (the share of gross capital formation 
in GDP). The link between rule of law and investment rates is significantly 
correlated in Hungary (see Chart 2); i.e., in the period after the accession the 
decline in rule of law performance may have impacted the value of investment. 
If we look at only private and household investment, Hungary’s figure was quite 
low in CEE in 2015 (see Table 3.).
Chart 1. Perceived corruption and economic performance in the EU 
*The higher the CPI, the less the perceived exposure to corruption 
Source: Eurostat, Transparency International 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tec00001&plugin=1  
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_ perceptions_index_2016  
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Chart 2. Correlation between rule of law and investment rate in Hungary 
* On a scale ranging between 1 and 100, where 1 is the weakest and 100 the best performance
** Share of gross capital formation in GDP
Source: World Bank, Eurostat
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec00011&language=en 
In sum, proxies indicate a continuous decline in governance quality in Hungary 
after EU accession. However, other qualitative research such as institutional 
analyses or case studies about the nature of the political system and corruption 
might generate more sophisticated conclusions.
Table 3. Investment rates in CEE 
 Private investment rates* in CEE (2015) (%)
Czech Republic 21,2
Estonia 20,2
Romania 19,9
Latvia 18,5
Bulgaria 17,2
Slovakia 17,2
Hungary 16,1
Lithuania 15,4
Poland 15,2
Slovenia 14,5
*Sum of business and household investment compared to GDP
Source: Eurostat
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tec00011&language=en 
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Centralization and systemic corruption 
When the government of Fidesz party took office in 2010, it created a 
completely new institutional framework. After 2010 the government extended 
its power to an extent that is unusual in liberal democracies, for example, by 
nominating loyal-to-government persons as heads of state institutions. As 
a result, many of these bodies have become instruments of the government’s 
power, rather than of control (Martin-Ligeti 2017)8. The determination of the 
government to weaken the capacity of independent institutions entailed their 
taking an instrumental approach towards formal institutions, including the 
constitution. Between 2010 and the entry into force of the Fundamental Law in 
2012, Hungary’s old constitution was amended 12 times. The country’s newly 
adopted Fundamental Law has been amended six times since it came into force. 
The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission concluded in its opinion that 
frequent constitutional amendments “are a worrying sign of an instrumental 
attitude towards the constitution.”9 
The quality of democracy has deteriorated across the whole CEE region 
(Freedom House 2014); moreover, the growth in the interlinkage of oligarchs 
and politicians is a worldwide phenomenon. However, Hungary is unique in the 
region for its U-turn (Kornai, 2015). Hungary, from all the countries in CEE, has 
deviated most spectacularly from the Western concept of democracy. The new 
Hungarian system has challenged the fundamental principles of good governance 
and capitalism (the rule of law and property rights), and has started a campaign 
to curtail the freedom of civil society10. Close-to-the-government oligarchs have 
bought themselves into the media sector using public money11. Moreover, the 
“obsession” with centralization, not only in politics but also in the economy, 
has reached an unprecedentedly high level, both in the EU and in terms of the 
post-1990 Hungarian history. The central government has now got tremendous 
regulatory and operational power and undue influence. 
8  For further analyses of the Hungarian government’s manoeuvres to systemically weaken 
democratic checks and balances, see TI Hungary’s report attached to Hungary’s Self-Assessment 
Survey on the United Nations Convention against Corruption: http://transparency.hu/uploads/docs/
Civil_society_review_report.pdf
9  See: Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, CDL-
AD(2013)012, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 17 June 2013, www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/?pdf=CDL-AD%282013%29012-e.  
10  See the new NGO law that discriminates against “foreign funded” organisations; in force since June 
2017: https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/06/hungarys-anti-foreign-ngo-law/530121/  
11  In: Transparency International 2017 (pp. 10-11.) Some other violations of property rights are 
elaborated in the next sub-sections. 
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The nature of corruption has significantly changed from that which existed 
before 2010. According to Transparency International, corruption was already 
substantial and institutionalized by 2008 (TI-H, 2008); i.e., the central and local 
governments regularly abused power for private gain in the form of fraud and 
bribery. But the level of centralized, top-down corruption reached new heights 
after 2010, parallel to democratic backsliding and major setbacks to the rule of 
law. The elimination of control institutions per se increased corruption risks. 
Complete systems of corruption have been intentionally built to reallocate 
resources and/or channel public money to the insiders. 
On the other hand, according to the Transparency International Global 
Corruption Barometer released in 2016, petty or street corruption in Hungary, 
apart from bribery in the healthcare sector, has decreased. The share of those 
who said that they had paid bribes to the police dropped from 10 % in 2012 
to 3 % in 201612. There has also been some whitening in some sectors of the 
economy that can be detected in the significant rise in VAT income13. However, 
these phenomena do not contradict but rather reinforce the interpretation that in 
Hungary corruption has become extremely centralized.
Some examples of centralized and systemic corruption are illustrated in the 
case studies described below14.  
The case of tobacco kiosk licenses
The government, by adopting the Tobacco Retailing Act in 2012, redefined 
the tobacco retailing market by first introducing a government monopoly and 
then distributing new concessions to tobacco kiosk owners under the pretext 
of preserving the health of Hungarian youth. The concept, as declared, was 
to decrease smoking by restricting the number of tobacco shops and denying 
the entry of young people into them. At the end of this process, the number of 
licensed tobacco kiosks had dropped from 40,000 to less than 6,000, damaging 
the property rights of several thousand kiosk owners. 
12  https://transparency.hu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Corruption-Barometer-2016-
Europe-and-Central-Asia.pdf
13  http://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/adozas/brutalis_feheredes_az_afaban.214671.htm l
14  In the case studies the author relies heavily on the work of Transparency International Hungary, 
and would like to thank his colleagues Miklós Ligeti, Head of Legal, and Gabriella Nagy, Head of 
Public Finance Programs for their initial descriptions.   
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Investigative journalists15 found that an early version of the Tobacco Retailing 
Act, submitted to the European Commission in 2013, had been drafted on a 
computer belonging to János Sánta, CEO of the Hungarian tobacco company 
Continental and chair of the Federation of Hungarian Tobacco Investors, thus 
an influential representative of the tobacco industry. Both the government and 
János Sánta admitted the involvement of the CEO in the adoption of the Tobacco 
Retailing Act. Reporters also revealed that some 500 tobacco kiosk licenses had 
been distributed to companies connected to the same CEO or belonging to his 
interest group of Continental Tobacco16. The reshaping of the tobacco market 
showcased favoritism, illustrating the government’s determination to employ its 
regulatory power to promote the business interests of political loyalists. 
Government residency bond scheme 
Taking the number of residency bonds into account, intermediary companies 
may have received a total of more than 136 million euros from the Hungarian 
state, a major contribution to their profit – without having to offer any service 
in exchange. Thus the net loss to the Hungarian taxpayers from this scheme 
might be in the order of 136 million euros.  The sum of 300,000 euros, the 
price of a Hungarian residency bond with five-year tenure, buys unhindered 
and permanent access to the Schengen-zone of the European Union for any 
non-EU citizen. Neither further investment nor personal presence in Hungary 
is required. Together with family members, approximately 16,000 third country 
nationals have thus been granted the right of free movement in the EU. 
The purchase of residency bonds channels large sums of Hungarian taxpayers’ 
money into the pockets of beneficiaries. Though issued by Hungary’s state 
debt management agency, applicants can only invest through intermediary 
companies. These companies are licensed – or deprived of their licenses – by the 
Hungarian Parliament’s Economic Committee in a procedure that falls outside 
the normal rules, and offers no recourse to legal remedy.
The proprietary structure of the intermediary companies remains unclear. 
All but one of them have seats in offshore havens, such as the Cayman Islands, 
Liechtenstein, Malta or Cyprus. This, on the one hand, makes it possible to allocate 
public funds to non-transparent recipients, a practice which is banned by Hungary’s 
15  E.g. see http://hvg.hu/itthon/20120227_lazar_dohanylobbi   .
16  E.g. see http://www.napi.hu/magyar_vallalatok/minden_tizedik_dohanybolt_continental-kozeli_
lehet.557230.html 
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Fundamental Law. On the other hand, it reveals that the Parliament Economic 
Committee, authorized by law to certify these companies, has either been outwitted 
or has willfully contributed to the selection of non-transparent companies.
Intermediary companies have been enriched at the expense of Hungarian 
taxpayers. According to an estimation of Transparency International Hungary, 
since the program started in 2013 they have presumably generated revenues of 
more than 320 million euros. A significant portion of the intermediary companies’ 
revenue comes from Hungarian public sources, as the government offers a 29,000 
euro discount on every 300,000 euro package of bonds. Taking the number 
of residency bonds into account (approximately 6200 until November 2017) 
intermediary companies may have received a total of more than 190 million  euros 
from the Hungarian state, a major contribution to their profit – without having to 
offer any service in exchange. Thus the net loss to the Hungarian taxpayers from 
this scheme might be in the order of 190 million euros. 
As oversight of these offshore companies and verification of their financial 
statements are entirely lacking, intermediary companies’ revenues remain 
untaxed in Hungary (with the exception of one company with domestic 
registration). Thus the Hungarian residency bond program is a non-transparent 
gateway to the European Union with no benefit to the Hungarian economy, but 
most probably contributing to private enrichment.
Undue spending of the central bank
One of 2016’s most significant cases involved the undue allocation of public 
funds worth approximately 900 million euros, equivalent to almost one 
percent of Hungary’s GDP, by the National Bank of Hungary to six foundations 
established in 2013 and 2014 by the central bank itself. In March 2016 the 
parliament adopted a retroactive law to prevent the central bank foundations’ 
expenses and operations from becoming public17. After opposition parties 
and anticorruption watchdogs heavily criticized the bill, President János 
Áder refused to sign it and referred it to the Constitutional Court for review. 
Then, one day prior to the Constitutional Court ruling, Hungary’s supreme 
law court, the Curia, ordered the Central Bank to publish data on how its six 
foundations had spent the assets. The data exposed the extensive conflicts 
of interest on Central Bank foundations’ boards, favoritism in Central Bank 
17  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-22/a-1-billion-central-bank-guide-for-
enriching-friends-and-family 
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foundations’ investment, and possible infringement of EU monetary financing 
rules as approximately two-thirds of the total sum was spent on the purchase 
of state bonds. Documents released by the foundations also showed that they 
had not issued public tenders for purchases as was required by the public 
procurement act. 
Eventually, the Constitutional Court of Hungary ruled that the law intended 
to hide these expenses was unconstitutional, and determined that, as the 
Central Bank serves public duties and manages public money, details about the 
foundations’ activities must remain publicly available. 
NGOs alluded to a connection between the reluctance of the prosecution 
service to investigate Central Bank funding issues and the fact that the wife 
of the prosecutor general, besides serving as the Central Bank’s head of 
human resources, was also a supervisory board member at two of the Central 
Bank’s foundations. On April 2016, Transparency International Hungary filed 
a criminal complaint against a non-specified person for misappropriation of 
public funds and abuse of public office on the Central Bank’s behalf. But the 
Prosecutor General’s Office declined to investigate. The Public Procurement 
Arbitration Board, a special state organization empowered to rule in public 
procurement cases, found that 66 out of 112 contracts involving the Central 
Bank’s foundations violated the law because no bids were invited, and fined the 
foundations 280 000 euros, a moderate sanction in light of the assets involved. 
System of public procurement
The functioning of the Hungarian public procurement system also shows 
signs of partial governance. Competition has been very limited in this field for 
a number of years. Proceedings without prior notification (i.e. those negotiated 
with a value above the EU threshold)18 accounted for 13 % of total public 
procurement market value in 2015, while the EU average was only 4 %. The 
local public procurement market accounted for 5.7 % of Hungarian GDP last 
year. In 2016, the proportion of tenders without prior publication decreased to 9 
% but still remained above the EU average. In 2016 there was only one tenderer 
in 36 % of public procurements, while the EU average was only 21 %. The 
18  This threshold for the procurements of goods and services is 135 000 euros but this 
amount can deviate according to some parameters. See details about thresholds here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation/
thresholds_en
274
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY VOL. 8 (2017)3S
JÓZSEF PÉTER MARTIN
Hungarian share of single-tenderer applicants is thus the fifth greatest among 
the member states19. 
Considering those procurements which are valued below the EU threshold, the 
gap between the Hungarian and EU figures has become even wider. According 
to the national data20, in 2013 70 % of the total number and 40 % of the value of 
public procurement procedures under the threshold were realized without prior 
notification, meaning that approximately 1 billion euros were allocated without 
any competition. 
A qualitative study of Transparency International Hungary (TI-H 2015) 
revealed the corrupt nature of the distribution of EU funds. According to this 
research, EU projects are overpriced on average by 25 % compared to market 
prices. Sixty per cent of EU funds are redistributed by public procurement, 
which has been distorted in the ways mentioned above. 
The partiality of the state in fund allocation, including EU funds, can be 
detected in the splendid enrichment of some of the oligarchs operating close 
to the government. The most obvious example of this is the case of Lőrinc 
Mészáros, a former gas-fitter and mayor of a small municipality, Felcsút, which 
happens to be the home town of PM Orbán. According to expert estimations, 
the wealth of Lőrinc Mészáros in 2017 accounted to around 380 million euros, 
more than five times that of 2016, placing him fifth on the list of the wealthiest 
Hungarians21. This might be the fastest enrichment in the course of Hungarian 
economic history22. 
An extensive analysis of public procurement data shows that friendship with 
Prime Minister Orbán pays off when it comes to winning tenders. According to 
the Corruption Research Center Budapest, a think tank five oligarchs around 
PM Orbán (either friends or relatives), including Lőrinc Mészáros, won 4.5 % 
of the total value of public procurements between 2009 and 2016. What is more 
notable is that when PM Orbán had a falling-out with a former longtime ally 
(Lajos Simicska) in 2015, the share of this oligarch’s winning tenders fell from 
11 % of the total in 2013 to 0.1 % in 201523.
19  See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cr_hungary_2016_en.pdf, p. 53., and https://ec.europa.
eu/info/sites/info/files/ 2017-european-semester-country-report-hungary-en_1.pdf, p. 35. 
20  See http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/00147/00147.pdf.   pp. 94-95. 
21  http://www.napi.hu/magyar_gazdasag/ itt_az_uj_lista_ok_a_leggazdagabbak_es_a_
legbefolyasosabbak_magyarorszagon.635525.html 
22  See details about the enrichment of Lőrinc Mészáros: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-07-25/what-s-boosting-the-world-s-best-performing-stock 
23  CRCB states that its researchers analyzed 150,000 instances of public procurement between 2009 
and 2015: http://www.crcb.eu/?p=1111 
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These issues might have contributed to the negative perceptions of domestic 
economic actors about the public procurement system: 81 % of businesses say 
that corruption is widespread in this field (the EU average is 71 %24).
Emergence of cronyism 
Crony capitalism refers to an economic system which is nominally free-
market but allows for preferential regulations and other state intervention based 
on favoritism, personal relationships and rent-seeking behavior (Salter 2014). If 
rent-seeking behavior prevails, money-making becomes possible based not just 
(or not primarily) on the basis of market performance, but on political loyalty. 
Economic actors are prone to seek the grace of the state (government) instead 
of competing on a regulated market. Rent-seekers may get privileges in terms 
of legislation such as direct subsidies, tax breaks, preferred access to credit, and 
protection from prosecution, etc. Cronyism is not necessarily linked to state 
ownership; private companies and entrepreneurs can also be the subjects of rent-
seeking. Rent-seeking distorts the market and undermines a level playing field, 
thus eventuates in suboptimal transactions through misallocation of resources 
(Murphy et al. 1993). Rent-seeking behavior is enhanced by the extractive 
institution that provides the ground for the abuse of power for private gain.
In one interpretation, cronyism is antithetical to the notion of capitalism, thus 
can be considered a separate system that may be positioned between the market 
and competition-driven capitalism and state-controlled socialism (Karam 
2017). While capitalism is seen as an economic system that exchanges value 
in a relatively neutral way through merit-based market allocation and which is 
fostered by a level playing field, cronyism benefits only those who are close to 
central power.  
Cases of open and legalized corruption in Hungary show the government’s 
intention to grant privileges to certain economic actors by legal means (for 
example, nationalization and subsequent redistribution of assets to players close 
to governments). In these cases the regulations are often tailor-made, hurting 
market incumbents and favoring new players with tighter or looser links to the 
government.
After 2010, the extreme centralization and the reshaping and 
instrumentalization of formal institutions in the government’s interests, on the 
24  European Commission’s Country Report 2016: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/cr_
hungary_2016_en.pdf  p. 53
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one hand, and the systemic and in some cases open and legalized corruption on 
the other, resulted in a system of state capture combined with cronyism. The 
Hungarian type of state capture is not ‘corporate’ or ‘oligarchical’ (Innes 2014) 
but is closer to the ‘reverse’ type (Kornai 2015) in which the final word is given 
by government politicians and some grey eminences and oligarchs around the 
executive power. One example of an obscure consultant is Árpád Habony, a 
mysterious speechwriter and advisor of PM Orbán who is considered to be one 
of the most influential oligarchs in terms of public decision-making around the 
PM, albeit lacking any formal position25. 
The regime at large operates using an unusual and informal network and a 
non-static combination of politicians and oligarchs. Public decision-makers 
and oligarchs extract public money from the system through intentionally 
designed and professionally managed channels (Jancsics-Jávor 2012). Under 
this system, corruption happens not primarily in the traditional form of graft, 
fraud or bribery, but through the endeavors of the elite to distort the political and 
economic system in its favor. Compared to the situation before 2010, we may say 
that corruption after the beginning of the decade has become part of the system, 
while in the past, despite its partly institutionalized character, it rather involved 
system disfunction.
As shown by the above examples, Hungary is heading towards a situation 
when players close to the government will extract a growing share of society’s 
wealth for themselves and their associates. The collusion of officials and the 
business elite provides both groups with undue benefits. This very collusion, 
labeled cronyism, is undermining both democracy and business competition, 
and thus economic performance.  
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS: A FUTURE CLASH 
BETWEEN ELITES AND POPULATION?  
In this paper I have elaborated on the question whether continuity or disruption 
prevail when it comes to political-economic developments in Hungary after 
2010. After having discussed the interplay between institutions and elites, I 
pointed out that the quality of governance measured by proxies has continuously 
deteriorated in Hungary since 2004 when the country joined the European 
Union. The diagnosis suggests that perception-based indicators, as well as some 
hard data about the economy, show no major shift or deviation from this general 
25  See e.g.:  http://hungarianspectrum.org/2013/03/04/orbans-chief-adviser-arpad-habony-and-his-
encounter-with-the-law/ 
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rule either due to the eruption of the global crisis in 2008, or due to the change 
of government in 2010.     
However, besides continuity, signs of disruption also prevail. The new regime 
and change of elite constructed by Fidesz after 2010 gave primary importance to 
the instrumentalization of formal institutions. Hungary has become vulnerable 
to a special kind of state capture (an informal network of public officials and 
businesspersons re-politicizing the state in pursuit of political monopoly and 
private gains). This form of capturing the state entails open and systemic 
corruption, and in a number of cases – some elaborated in this paper – even 
takes a legalized shape. Moreover, cronyism evolved, an economic system 
that undermines the level playing field, distorts the market, and favors loyal-
to-government players. The need for the establishment of a “new national 
bourgeoisie and middle class”26 is a frequently heard ideological argument 
of government stakeholders for explaining income and asset redistribution. 
However, according to empirical studies (e.g. Rothstein 2011, WEF 2001-
2017), the systematic abuse of public office undermines good governance and 
competitiveness.       
How might these trends change? The new elite paradigm suggests that it is 
mainly public opinion that can constrain and counter the elite’s endeavors. In a 
more indirect way, institutionalism comes to the same conclusion. In 2017, some 
of the population’s attitudes indicate resistance to the ruling regime. Although 
Fidesz still enjoys the support of a large majority of the voting population 
according to the recent polls27, and would win an election if held “today” 
(September 2017), on some issues the government’s stances clearly go against 
the popular will. The adamant anti-EU rhetoric of the government – mainly that 
of PM Orbán – for example, has not got through to the population (Martin 2016). 
Three-quarters of Hungarians support Hungary’s membership of the EU28, and 
even ‘soft Euroscepticism’ based on pragmatic revulsion has declined. 
Despite Fidesz’s popularity, a rise in dissatisfaction can be detected in 
public opinion. According to a Eurobarometer survey, dissatisfaction with 
“national democracy” has become the highest in Hungary in 2016 among the 
Visegrad countries29 (56 % of Hungarians say that they are “not or not at all” 
26  See e.g. http://hungarianspectrum.org/2011/12/26/the-ministry-of-national-development-and-the-
building-of-a-national-bourgeoisie/ 
27  See: http://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/public-opinion-polls/ 
28  See: http://index.hu/belfold/2017/03/24/granitszilardsagu_a_magyarok_elkotelezettsege_az_eu-
tagsag_mellett/ 
29  http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/45/
groupKy/226 
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satisfied with the current state of democracy). In another survey conducted 
by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)30, only 
slightly more than half of the population think that elections are free (53%) or 
that freedom of speech prevails (55%), and as few as 37% of Hungarians say 
that the judicial system works properly. These trends indicate that the system 
may be challenged, not only by economic sustainability but also by public 
discontent.
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